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1 ABSTRACT 
The compatibility of, and conflict between, resilience and sustainability has received increasing attention in 
recent years, most notably in relation to the design, construction and operation of urban spaces.  Considering 
that urban spaces can be fixed in time scales that range from several years to several decades and beyond, as 
well as the heightened influence of fiscal concerns at present and in the future, there is a need to understand 
and consider such interconnectivities at the earliest possible opportunity.  Drawing upon ongoing research 
into the design of safer urban spaces, the relationship between resilience and sustainability was analysed 
through the exploration of whether emergency planning and the design of space could further both agendas.  
A state of the art literature review was conducted, as were eleven interviews with key stakeholders in the 
fields of emergency planning and resilience in the United Kingdom (UK).   
Analysis of the above provided results indicating that a range of promising practice has been occuring in the 
UK, practice that not only increases the resilience of urban spaces to a range of hazards, threats and major 
accidents, but that is integral to the sustainability of the built environment itself.  However, also apparent is 
the impact of the current fiscal situation, including the Government‟s extensive public sector spending cuts 
that are threatening the progress that has been made in relation to resilience and emergency planning; 
impacts which emphasise the need to identify long-term incentives and cost-effective solutions to the 
protection of the built environment.  Conclusions drawn purport that whilst resilience is integral to 
sustainability and not merely compatible or conducive to it, a framework is required to further understand the 
integrated nature of urban space and how its users are made safer, built assets can be made less vulnerable to 
damage, and its natural environments are more protected. 
2 INTRODUCTION 
This paper is based on preparatory work for the development of an integrated security and resilience design 
assessment framework, as part of the Designing Safer Urban Spaces (DESURBS) project, which is funded 
under the EU Framework Programme 7 Security Programme.  DESURBS explores urban space security 
issues, looking at how the involvement of local stakeholders in integrated security and resilience can 
improve urban security.  The geographic focus of DESURBS is international, but concentrated research is 
being conducted in the cities of Nottingham (UK), Jerusalem (Israel), and Barcelona (Spain).  Outputs of the 
project will include urban resilient design guidelines and a web-based decision support portal.  The 
DESURBS project is a consortium of eight partners from five countries.  This paper is produced by 
consortium partners at Loughborough University, with a particular focus on the Nottinghamshire region and 
the City of Nottingham itself. 
2.1 Aim 
The aim of the paper is to examine the relationship between resilience and sustainability, through the 
exploration of emergency planning and urban and building design, within the UK. This is being conducted in 
order to further understand the integrated nature of the built environment and how its users and assets can be 
better protected from the range of hazards, threats and major accidents that pose a risk to them.   
2.2 Methodology 
The methodology for this activity comprises a review of literature, together with semi-structured interviews 
with eleven key stakeholders involved in emergency planning and resilience in Nottingham and 
Nottinghamshire. The review used a web-based search of documentation, legislation and organisational 
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information, most of which is readily available online, through local authority and government websites.  
Several databases were also interrogated such as the Construction Information Service (CIS), Web of 
Science, ICE Virtual Library, and Health and Safety Science Abstracts.  The key informants were sourced 
from member organisations of the Nottingham and Nottinghamshire Local Resilience Forum (LRF), which 
exists to “establish and maintain effective multi-agency arrangements to respond to major emergencies, to 
minimise the impact of those emergencies on the public, property and environment of Nottingham and 
Nottinghamshire” (Nottingham City Council, 2009). 
2.3 Nottingham and its LRF 
Nottinghamshire is a county in the East Midlands region of England with an estimated population of just 
over one million, about 350,000 of whom live in the city (Nottingham and Nottinghamshire Local Resilience 
Forum, 2011). Nottingham has main railway links to London (in the South) and Sheffield (in the North). The 
M1 motorway runs through the county, as does the A1 main trunk road. East Midlands International Airport 
is about 15 miles from the city. Nottingham has a vibrant city centre, renowned for shopping and 
entertainment. It is also home to several sporting facilities, namely the Nottingham Forest and Notts County 
football clubs, Nottinghamshire County Cricket Club and the National Water Sports Centre. 
The LRF has several levels of involvement in emergency planning and resilience. The strategic (Gold) level 
consists of the Chief Constable, the Deputy Chief Executive of the Council, the local director of the 
Environment Agency, chief executives from the emergency services, and a representative from Nottingham 
University Hospital Trust.  The tactical (Silver) level comprises middle management personnel, but includes 
the head of the County Council, and senior emergency planners.  The operational (Bronze) level is made up 
of people who work on the ground responding to emergency situations and incidents.  The Nottingham and 
Nottinghamshire LRF meets three times a year.  A number of sub groups with specific areas of responsibility 
such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN), pandemic influenza, and flood response meet 
six times a year and report to the LRF.  The process they adhere to in terms of risk assessment and how that 
influences emergency planned is shown in Figure 1 below. 
 
Fig. 1: Cycle of Risk Assessment and Emergency Planning (Nottingham and Nottinghamshire Local Resilience Forum, 2011) 
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3 RESILIENCE AND THE UK 
Geis (2000, p.154) states that the „built environment‟ encompasses the substantive physical framework in 
which society can function in its social, economic, political and institutional aspects.  However, not only 
does the built environment facilitate the functioning of society, it also represents the majority of national 
savings and investment (Little, 2002; Ofori, 2008).  Yet the built environment itself is not designed purely to 
accommodate these functions alone, as a vast array of legislated considerations and other options and 
pressures influence the design, construction and operation of the built environment.  Pertinent to this paper is 
the array of hazards, threats and major accidents that can pose risks to urban space and those who use it, as 
the consequences of those risks manifesting themselves can be so profound as to nullify years of 
development and investment (Dainty and Bosher, 2008, p.358).  Urban space must therefore be planned, 
designed, built, managed and operated so that it is, and supporting systems are, „resilient‟. 
3.1 The Concept of Resilience 
In order to understand what constitutes a resilient built environment, and what the term „resilient‟ means, the 
origins of the term must first be explored.  Sapountzaki (2007, p.298) and Klein et al. (2003, p.35) highlight 
that the Latin root of the word is „resilio‟, which means to „jump back‟; what could be considered as 
returning to a previous state.  Bosher & Dainty (2011) suggest that the concept of resilience primarily 
emerged in research concerned with how ecological systems cope with stresses or disturbances caused by 
external factors (see Errington, 1953; Blum, 1968), but has more recently been applied to human social 
systems (Manyena, 2006), economic recovery (Rose, 2004), engineering (Hollnagel et al., 2006) and urban 
planning and recovery after calamitous events (Vale and Campanella, 2005).  
Holling (1973, p.14) asserted that resilience is the “measure of the persistence of systems and their ability to 
absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between populations or state 
variables”.  However, as asserted by Bosher (2008, p.13), such definitions are evolving to capture that it is 
not sufficient for systems to simply „bounce back„ or return to a previous state, as the system needs to be a 
more robust version of this.  Resilience can therefore be seen as the ability of an asset to cope with 
disruption, maintain essential operations, return to normal operations after the disruption has ended, and 
elevate to a more-informed state.  Determining an asset‟s resilience will, therefore, always result in the 
question „resilience of what, to what?‟ (Carpenter et al., 2001, p.779).  
3.2 Within the UK 
Within the UK, the resilience of the built environment has been given increasing attention over the past 
decade, with a range of obligations and incentives to aid in reducing the vulnerability of the built 
environment to the plethora of hazards, threats and major accidents that pose a risk to it (Harre-Young, 
2012).  Advancements have occurred particularly in relation to the two areas of emergency planning, and 
urban and building design, each of which will now be explored. 
3.2.1 Emergency Planning 
The UK has a well established formal system for emergency planning, namely the Civil Contingencies Act 
(CCA) 2004 (Civil Contingencies Secretariat, 2004).  Prior to this, civil protection legislation dated back to 
1948 with the notion of hostile attack from a foreign power.  The year 2000 is known as „the year of the 4 
F‟s‟, as fuel shortages, severe flooding, foot and mouth disease, and Fire Service strikes highlighted the need 
to re-think emergency planning nationally, regionally, and locally, and that new legislative measures were 
needed to ensure that there was an adequate framework for such arrangements.  The CCA has two parts: 
local arrangements for civil protection, and emergency powers, and it redefined the concept of „emergency‟ 
to cover threats from international terrorism, the loss of communication systems, as well as such risks as 
biological or chemical contamination of the environment. 
The CCA stipulates two categories of front line responders (category one and category two responders) and 
identifies their duties and responsibilities relating to „localised incidents through to catastrophic events‟ 
(Civil Contingencies Secretariat, 2004, p.2). Category one responders, or „core responders‟, are the 
emergency services, all principal local authorities, National Health Service bodies and key government 
agencies.  Category two responders comprise „co-operating responders‟, such as utility companies, transport 
operators, strategic health authorities, the Health and Safety Executive, and voluntary agencies.  The CCA 
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also describes the duty of these agencies to cooperate in a Local Resilience Forum (LRF), based on each 
police area (HM Government, 2004), although in many instances, such forums (co-ordinated groups of 
category one and two responders who undertake risk assessments and carry out mitigative activities 
accordingly) existed in other forms prior to the Act coming into force. 
3.2.2 Urban and Building Design 
Urban and building design has also been used to advance resilience, and has arguably been seen as a 
„universal remedy‟ to an ever-increasing array of socio-economic problems, policy priorities, and risks and 
threats that contemporary society faces (Bretherton and Coaffee, 2009, p.35).  The use of such design has 
traditionally been associated with territorial control in the face of terrorist threats, through the regulation, 
restriction and control of access, and ensuring surveillance coverage (Coaffee et al., 2009, p.489).  Rogers 
and Coaffee (2005, p.323) assert that government policy has been concerned with making the environment of 
cities more attractive as a whole, whilst also improving safety and security.  HM Government (2010, p.5) 
states that the incorporation of counter terrorism into the built environment is to be achieved within the 
overall aim of creating high quality public places.  Whilst Harre-Young (2012) highlights that the protection 
of places can occur through the use of organisational measures such as business continuity management, 
concern regarding the modification of the built environment remains a constant presence, as highlighted by 
Coaffee (2010, p.940): "we need to consider the ‘physical’ changes brought about through counterterrorism 
measures being embedded in the urban landscape as a result of heightened terror threat levels”.  Harre-
Young (2012), however, highlighted that urban and building design that leads to increased resilience can 
have a number of advantages, including the ability of measures for specific risks (e.g. counter terrorism or 
flood risk management measures) being able to do more than their intended outcome, and that commerical 
and fiscal gains can be accrued by doing so, all of which furthers the resilience of the built environment and 
its longevity. 
 
4 PROMISING PRACTICE 
Evident above are the ways in which emergency planning and the use of urban and building design can 
increase the resilience of the built environment and those who use it to a vast array of hazards, threats and 
major accidents.  Further still, analysis of literature and of the data collected from the interviews with key 
stakeholders involved in emergency planning and resilience shows that there is not only promising practice 
occurring that needs to be highlighted as such, but that increases in resilience can be an integral part of the 
sustainability of the built environment. 
4.1 Resilience in its own Right 
Feedback from respondents strongly suggested that the Nottingham and Nottinghamshire LRF is an effective 
mechanism which facilitates an integrated multi-agency response. A number of reasons were suggested for 
this, which included debriefing practices, the testing and exercising of plans, business continuity planning, 
communicating with the public, the engagement with and role of voluntary services, and the extent to which 
community resilience has been encouraged and developed.  Three of the most important aspects that were 
evident were the relationships between stakeholders, emergency response, and the input of stakeholders into 
urban design itself. 
4.1.1 Relationships 
At an organisational level, it was raised that the success of the Nottingham and Nottinghamshire LRF is due 
to: “the fact that they look at every single department, every single group that should be there, not just it’s 
Police, Fire, council” [Interview(I)11. Senior Manager, Voluntary Service].  This inclusive approach allows 
a wide range of sub-groups to be created, which are generally seen to be an effective way of working: “If you 
want to produce some meaningful work which is done with cooperation, which is a requirement of the Act, 
then you really need those sub-groups in place” [I8. Senior Manager - Planning Organisation].  Good 
governance and management of those involved was stated as being essential to the effective working of the 
LRF [I5. Emergency Planner - Planning Organisation].  Noted was the Secretariat to the LRF and that it 
alternates every two years between the City and County Councils, which results in a slight competitive 
aspect that typically has positive impacts [I7. Emergency Planner - Fire and Rescue Service].   
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Individual personalities were emphasised as being an important factor in the effective working of the LRF: “I 
think the partners work well as a group. I think it is personality. And the chairs of most of the standing 
groups all work well together” [I4. Manager - Care Trust].  The fact that key stakeholders know each other 
and their ways of working together strengthens the resilience of relationships within the group and 
ultimately, their effectiveness in planning for and responding to emergencies. 
4.1.2 Response 
All LRF partners can activate command and control procedures when a situation that cannot be managed 
using normal management structures occurs [I6. Manager - Health Trust].  When this occurs, a Gold 
(strategic) Commander is identified from the lead agency, followed by lower levels of Silver (tactical) and 
Bronze (operational).  These roles can be subject to change, as for example, a fire might result in the Fire 
Service leading Gold, yet the site could become a crime scene, which would result in the Police taking over.  
The protocols for response are well known and rehearsed among the stakeholders and can be operationalised 
extremely quickly.  Therefore, in a major incident, everyone is familiar with the different roles and who to 
communicate with: “a big factory going up in smoke, they [the Fire Service] would let us know… So then we 
would deploy people to site, we’d open our incident room up at our Nottingham office, that’s our area 
incident room, and we’ve got a hierarchy of roles that we would send out and they’re trained to go to the 
right place at the rendezvous point and speak to the right people and respond in a professional way” [I8. 
Senior Manager - Planning Organisation].  In situations which exceed the capacities of the local agencies, 
mutual aid is invoked with agencies from other regions, with those arrangements also going through 
periodical testing and exercising. 
4.1.3 Input into Urban Design 
The Police, the Fire Service and the Environment Agency have input into the design and planning of urban 
buildings and environments.  Specifically in relation to counter terrorism, domestic extremism, and 
hazardous sites and substances, the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) co-ordinates 
trained Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs), who are Police staff embedded within each Police 
Force to undertake threat and risk assessments and provide advice to a range of stakeholders.  The Police 
also have a number of Architectural Liaison Officers (ALOs), who provide advice to those planning new 
builds on matters relating to „lesser crime‟ than terrorism.  As there is no legal obligation for organisations to 
adhere to any advice given, this is therefore couched in terms of developing and increasing business 
continuity, which is evident in literature (Harre-Young, 2012).  Fire regulations exist for all new buildings 
and the Fire and Rescue Service has legal responsibility for their enforcement.  However, the Fire and 
Rescue service only has statutory rights over enforcement of legislation from “the point at which the building 
is finished and then occupied” [I7. Emergency Planner - Fire and Rescue Service]. 
4.2 Contributions to Sustainability 
The relationship between resilience and sustainability has been evident in literature for a number of years, 
with notions of „turquoise design theories„ to denote the typical associations of resilience/security with the 
colour blue, and sustainability/environmental with the colour green (Perelman, 2008).  The developments in 
resilience, emergency planning, and urban and building design, as previously outlined (Bosher and Dainty, 
2011; Coaffee, 2009), have arisen most notably through the emergence of resilience as the key discourse in 
relation to security, and being an objective of society through to individual buildings.  Perelman (2008) states 
that this is the very essence of „turquoise design‟ and the true meaning of resilience; resilience is the merging 
of security and safety concerns with the broader goals of sustainability and sustainable development.   
Coaffee (2008, p.4636) states that “in future decades it is most likely that the sustainability agenda will 
provide the most appropriate policy vehicle for the achievement of resilience, with security seen as an 
essential element of corporate and organisational responsibility alongside economic, environmental and 
social concerns”.  Such assertions are also evident in a range of governmental and non-governmental 
literature (Fussey et al., 2011; Coaffee and Bosher, 2008; Zimmerman, 2008).  However, how such practices 
are carried out and incorporated is unclear, although a number of synergies have been identified.  For 
example, Harre-Young (2012) identified that the incorporation of counter terrorism measures mitigated the 
impacts of a range of other threats, hazards and major accidents, prolonging the longevity of buildings and 
urban space, and also highlighted a range of environmental benefits. 
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4.2.1 Integrating Resilience and Sustainability Approaches 
Coaffee and Bosher (2008) provide examples of how the potential synergies between resilience (specifically 
security aspects of resilience) and sustainability might include developing landscaping systems that are both 
„green‟ and can conform to Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles.  For 
example, ponds and strategically planted trees can be used as physical barriers against vehicle-borne crime 
such as „car bombs‟ and „ram-raiders‟, instead of using expanses of concrete and rows of steel bollards.  It is 
also possible that such ponds and landscaping features could be used as part of sustainable urban drainage 
systems (SUDS) that are designed to reduce the occurrence and impact of flooding in urban areas (Coaffee 
and Bosher, 2008). 
It is also suggested that integrating security systems with other built systems at the design stage (whole 
building design) can reduce energy use, as can the use of thick thermal walls or window film, which better 
insulates a building while providing additional blast resistance or fire protection (Coaffee and Bosher 2008). 
Arguably, in the future a more inclusive and joined-up approach to integrating resilience and environmental 
sustainability should be advanced through the greater collaboration between a wide range of stakeholders - 
architects, engineers, planners, the police, insurers, surveyors importantly, the public, who are, or should be, 
involved with the planning, design, construction, operation and management of urban spaces.  However, 
while the respondents in Nottingham were generally open to these types of integrated approaches, where 
resilience and sustainability could be coalesced, a number of barriers were identified that would undoubtably 
impede the transition from theory to practice; these barriers are discussed in the next section.   
5 BARRIERS TO PROMISING PRACTICE 
Despite the promising approaches that have been identified within Nottingham and beyond, barriers to such 
practice being further developed and incorporated are evident, most notably the fragmented nature of the 
construction industry itself (Bosher and Dainty, 2011).  However, other factors were also identified through 
the key informant interviews, those being fiscal constraints, strategic sign-up, communicating with the 
public, and the use of tools and hardware, all of which impact the potential of emergency planning and the 
design or urban space and buildings. 
5.1 Fiscal Constraints 
The LRF is not a legal entity and there is no budget for its activities; associated costs are met by the relevant 
agency or sector involved.  All respondents expressed concerns about the current fiscal situation, and in 
particular, the impact of the UK Government‟s spending cutbacks to public services such as emergency 
planning.  This has resulted in prioritising resources to the groups that have the „biggest impact‟ [I7. 
Emergency Planner - Fire and Rescue Service] and staff cut-backs resulting in some issues being left until a 
later date [I1. Emergency Plannger - Local Authority], which ultimately affects resilience [I4. Manager - 
Primary Care Trust].  The full impact of budget cuts is yet to be quantified or qualified, but the fear is it will 
result in a lack of insurance against incidents, “because if you want that insurance policy, you need that 
resilience” [I9. Emergency Planner - Police Force]; without it, progress that has been made in relation to 
resilience and emergency planning could be lost.  Within these constraints, there is a need to identify long-
term incentives and cost-effective solutions for the protection of the built environment.   
Harre-Young (2012) has identified such incentives and solutions in the context of counter terrorism design 
features, which can include reductions in risk and injuries, competitive gains for engaged stakeholders, 
revenue generation, increases in reputation, increases in property and area values, and potential insurance 
incentives.  As an example, Harre-Young (ibid.) highlights that exclusion of traffic from a given area 
(measures that can be used to do so are presented in Figure 2) can be a costly approach to incorporate, 
depending on the size and context of the space being protected, yet there are numerous benefits, apart from 
the mitigation of not just vehicle-borne terrorism, but: the mitigation of other forms of crime (such as ram-
raiding), reductions in noise and air pollution, less soiling of buildings, increased safety of pedestrians 
within, and increased footfall that has resulted in increased turnover for retail outlets within the protected 
zone.  It is therefore argued that the incorporation of resiliency measures are a fundamental aspect of 
sustainability, due to the measures being able to protect and sustain the life of urban spaces that they protect.  
The aforementioned incentives, therefore, could be suitable for making the costs of some resilience measures 
more viable or acceptable in both financial and aesthetic terms, and therefore aid in supporting business 
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cases for incorporating what could be costly resiliency measures, as well as the overcoming of the other 
constraints that are outlined in the rest of this section. 
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Fig. 2: Measures that can be used to exclude vehicles from a given area (Harre-Young, 2012) 
5.2 Strategic Sign-Up 
Getting senior management to engage with the LRF process was noted as being difficult, as those in senior 
positions prioritised issues as they saw fit, rather than according to those defined by the LRF.  An example is 
the need for key decision makers to attend meetings: “you need people there who have got the authority to 
make decisions, that could spend millions if they needed to” [I10. Manager - Ambulance Service].  There 
were also concerns about the quality of the multi agency plans as these are difficult to achieve without high 
level support; “it’s about getting people’s buy-in for something that you might perceive as important but 
actually they think it’s somebody else’s job to do” [I5. Emergency Planner - Planning Organisation].  
Authorising the mainstreaming of resilience issues within organisations is an area for improvement, and a 
lack of awareness of agency involvement in the LRF prevents personnel from engaging with the process, 
with an example being given of a community safety department not being involved in a „warning and 
informing‟ sub-group, despite the potential benefit of their involvement. 
5.2 Communicating with the Public 
The UK Government‟s Community Resilience Programme (HM Government, 2011, p.5) aims to “increase 
individual, family and community resilience against all threats and hazards”.  An important aspect of this 
aim is the requirement to facilitate discussion between all stakeholders, including central government, 
emergency services, the voluntary sector and communities on good practice. Giving the general public, and 
specifically local communities, this shared responsibility in ensuring community resilience is arguably a sub-
text to the UK Government‟s strategy to devolve resilience decision-making to the regional and local levels 
so that interventions are more likely to be self-sustaining.   
Central to the Communitry Resilience Framework is effective risk communication at local level to increase 
awareness and enhance public response.  Although there are advances in this area, some interventions that 
would increase resilience require legislation, in order to, for example, allow mobile phone broadcasts to be 
made “and just blast everybody’s mobile phone to say there’s been an incident in Nottingham city centre, 
please make your way to wherever, and that technology exists” [I9. Emergency Planner - Police Force].  A 
flood warning system used by the Environment Agency to warn the public of flood risk exists, however take 
up of this is low, as homeowners “don’t want to know because it potentially affects their insurance” [I8. 
Senior Manager - Planning Organisation].  Consequently, the Environment Agency is considering how to 
make membership of this list the default position.  
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5.3 Use of Tools and Hardware 
While different agencies use various tools and hardware, there is no common information management 
system subscribed to by all, although all stakeholders can subscribe to the secure National Resilience 
Extranet (NRE) which was developed by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat to provide access to restricted 
documents.  Although agencies have been encouraged to do this, not all have done so, with one reason being 
that it can cost between £15-20,000 per organisation.  Atlas Incident Management System (AIMS) is used by 
several responders however, including the Ambulance service, the Police, the Fire and Rescue Service, and 
the County and City Councils.  The system works through the logging of information and the actions that are 
required, the allocation of someone to achieve those actions, and whether this has been completed or not [I7. 
Emergency Planner - Fire and Rescue Service].  The above challenges of strategy, finance and 
communication are areas that underpin all aspects of resilience; without addressing these broader issues, the 
success and long-term sustainability of the multi-agency response enshrined in the LRF cannot be 
guaranteed, despite the skills and efforts of the individuals and organisations involved.  
6 CONCLUSION 
This paper has explored the interconnectiviites between resilience and sustainability in relation to emergency 
planning and urban design within the UK.  Ideally, the design, construction and operation of urban space 
should be based on principles that are both sustainable and resilient.  With this as a starting point, ensuring 
resilient management and operation of these spaces naturally follows. However, a further challenge is to 
manage the existing urban built environment to ensure that effective emergency planning is in place and 
resilience is maximised.  The Nottingham case study highlights a range of promising practice in the UK that 
increases the resilience of urban space to a range of hazards, threats and major accidents.  Central to such 
successful practice has been the effective individual and organisational relationships, familiar structures for 
command and control, and level of input into the design of urban space.  These examples demonstrate that 
resilience is actually an integral part of the sustainability of urban space, and not simply compatible with it.   
However, such progress is threatened by the potential impact of fiscal constraints and in particular the public 
sector spending cuts, the difficulty in securing senior management engagement with the LRF, and 
communication and engagement with the public and local communities.  These factors are inevitably linked 
as increased prioritisation is demanded by restricted budgets.  Research has already shown that incorporating 
resiliency measures can also lead to environmental benefits and increased sustainability, so there is a need to 
identify such cost-effective solutions for stakeholders so that they continue to prioritise the protection of 
urban space.  However, further investigation is needed to better understand the integrated nature of urban 
space, how its users are made safer, how its natural environments are better protected, and how urban space 
can be made less vulnerable to the vast array of hazards, threats and major accidents that pose risks to it. 
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